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Le paradoxe des nouvelles politiques d'insertion

Author

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  • Jekaterina Dmitrijeva

    (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12, TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Florent Fremigacci

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Yannick L'Horty

    (TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12)

Abstract

Les politiques d'insertion qui sont mises en œuvre par les départements français ont été modifiées en profondeur depuis la réforme du RSA. Elles sont désormais organisées selon une logique de parcours dans lesquels sont orientées les personnes après une évaluation de leur situation et des obstacles rencontrés dans leur accès à l'emploi. En mobilisant des données départementales inédites sur une cohorte d'entrants au RSA, nous montrons que cette organisation d'ensemble répond effectivement à la variété des besoins des allocataires en matière d'actions d'insertion. Pour autant, nous constatons également une faible participation des personnes aux actions départementales, ce qui constitue un paradoxe. Nous analysons plus en détail l'ampleur et les causes du non-recours pour un dispositif départemental d'insertion qui consiste en un bouquet de 15 ateliers dans une logique de construction de parcours individualisé. Alors qu'il couvre un large spectre de besoins et de thématiques, le taux de participation à ce dispositif n'est que de 13 %. Pour analyser les causes de cette faible participation, nous proposons une décomposition de la participation en trois éléments : être invité à participer ; accepter l'invitation ; être présent à l'invitation. Cette décomposition permet d'isoler les responsabilités du côté de la demande (les comportements des bénéficiaires) et celles du côté de l'offre d'actions d'insertion. Nous montrons que les facteurs d'offre jouent un rôle essentiel dans la faible participation aux actions d'insertion et que cela tient à la nature même des nouvelles politiques d'insertion.

Suggested Citation

  • Jekaterina Dmitrijeva & Florent Fremigacci & Yannick L'Horty, 2013. "Le paradoxe des nouvelles politiques d'insertion," Working Papers halshs-00856272, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00856272
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00856272v1
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    2. Sylvain Chareyron, 2016. "Le non-recours aux aides sociales sous conditions de ressources," Erudite Ph.D Dissertations, Erudite, number ph16-01 edited by Yannick L'Horty & François Legendre, December.
    3. Mélika Ben Salem & Aurélien Boyer & Muriel Roger & Michaël Zemmour, 2025. "Dynamique des allocataires du RSA à Paris," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-05400100, HAL.

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