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Ambiguity, Social Opinion and the Use of Common Property Resources

  • Dimitrios Diamantaras

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Temple University)

  • Robert P. Gilles

    ()

    (Management School, Queen's University)

In this paper we argue that ambiguity, combined with social opinion formation can be represented as part of a game-theoretic equilibrium concept that transcends the standard Nash equilibrium concept, applied to a model of the tragedy of the commons. Our modeling can shed some light on the international environment crisis and the relevant ongoing international negotiations. We conclude that social opinion formation in most cases has a significant impact on equilibrium common property resource usage.

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File URL: http://www.cla.temple.edu/RePEc/documents/detu_10_06.pdf
File Function: First version, 2010
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Department of Economics, Temple University in its series DETU Working Papers with number 1006.

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Date of creation: Apr 2010
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Handle: RePEc:tem:wpaper:1006
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  1. Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 2008. "Are the Treasures of Game Theory Ambiguous?," Working Papers 0469, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2008.
  2. Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 2014. "Optimism And Pessimism In Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 483-505, 05.
  3. Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs, 2001. "Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2925, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Eichberger, Jürgen & Kelsey, David & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2005. "Ambiguity and Social Interaction," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 59, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  5. David Schmeidler, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7662, David K. Levine.
  6. Chateauneuf, Alain & Eichberger, Jurgen & Grant, Simon, 2007. "Choice under uncertainty with the best and worst in mind: Neo-additive capacities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 538-567, November.
  7. Burkhard C. Schipper & Juergen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 2006. "Granny versus Game Theorist: Ambiguity in Experimental Games," Working Papers 627, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  8. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
  9. Pan, Zhengzheng, 2010. "Trust, influence, and convergence of behavior in social networks," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 69-78, July.
  10. Kolstad, Charles D., 2007. "Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 68-79, January.
  11. Alistair Ulph, 2004. "Stable International Environmental Agreements with a Stock Pollutant, Uncertainty and Learning," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 53-73, 07.
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