Making Fiscal Commitments Credible
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Caroline Klein & Robert Price & Andreas Wörgötter, 2013. "Improving the Fiscal Framework to Enhance Growth in an Era of Fiscal Consolidation in Slovakia," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1018, OECD Publishing.
- Ludovit Odor, 2014. "Fiscal Risk Assessment at the CBR: A Conceptual Framework," Discussion Papers Discussion Paper No. 1/20, Council for Budget Responsibility.
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More about this item
Keywords
Fiscal rules; Fiscal Council; Time inconsistence; Net worth;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBA-2010-08-28 (Central Banking)
- NEP-EEC-2010-08-28 (European Economics)
- NEP-IFN-2010-08-28 (International Finance)
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