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Electoral Integrity, the Concession of Power, and the Disciplining Role of Protests

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  • Chanelle Duley
  • Prasanna Gai

Abstract

Coordination on mass protest plays an important disciplining role in ensuring compliance with electoral rules, with elections serving as a public signal of the incumbent’s popularity. But the link between the informativeness of the election and the enforceability of electoral rules hinges crucially on the veracity of the electoral process. We model how doubt about electoral integrity influences compliance with electoral rules. Our analysis explains why electoral rules in advanced democracies are less resilient, and incumbents less willing to step aside, than suggested by the standard model of electoral turnover. We clarify how incumbent behaviour responds to changes in the cost of protest, and external overtures that make stepping down more attractive. Our findings contribute to the debate on the role of equilibrium multiplicity in models of mass uprisings.

Suggested Citation

  • Chanelle Duley & Prasanna Gai, 2024. "Electoral Integrity, the Concession of Power, and the Disciplining Role of Protests," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 68(1), pages 138-165, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:68:y:2024:i:1:p:138-165
    DOI: 10.1177/00220027231158055
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Will the Sovereign Debt Market Survive?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 85-90, May.
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