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Hot Air as an Implicit Side Payment Arrangement: Could a Hot Air Provision have Saved the Kyoto-Agreement?

Author

Listed:
  • Urs Steiner Brandt

    (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark)

  • Gert Tinggaard Svendsen

    (Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the presence of Hot Air trading jeopardizes the environmental target of an international environmental agree-ment. We argue that Hot Air can be used as an implicit side-payment mecha-nism to actually bring about higher environmental protection compared to the situation without the trade option. We point to the existence of a fundamental trade-off between costs of compliance and the creation of dynamic incentives to develop cheaper reduction technologies. Implicit side-payments, in terms of Hot Air provision, may be needed in order to establish a compromise between these opposing demands. We identify the shortcomings and benefits of allowing fully flexible permit trading including the allocation rule of grandfathering.

Suggested Citation

  • Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2003. "Hot Air as an Implicit Side Payment Arrangement: Could a Hot Air Provision have Saved the Kyoto-Agreement?," Working Papers 42/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:sdk:wpaper:42
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Brandt, Urs Steiner & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2006. "Climate change negotiations and first-mover advantages: the case of the wind turbine industry," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 1175-1184, July.
    2. Brandt, Urs Steiner & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2004. "Switch Point and First-Mover Advantage: The Case of the Wind Turbine Industry," Working Papers 04-2, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hot Air; Global GHG trade; Kyoto protocol; Grandfathering; Cost issue; EU; US;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

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