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A SNCP Method for Solving Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints

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  • Che-Lin Su

Abstract

This paper studies algorithms for equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPECs). We present a generalization of Scholtes’s regularization scheme for MPECs and extend his convergence results to this new relaxation method. We propose a sequential nonlinear complementarity (SNCP) algorithm to solve EPECs and establish the convergence of this algorithm. We present numerical results comparing the SNCP algorithm and diagonalization (nonlinear Gauss- Seidel and nonlinear Jacobi) methods on randomly generated EPEC test problems. The computational experience to date shows that both the SNCP algorithm and the nonlinear Gauss-Seidel method outperform the nonlinear Jacobi method

Suggested Citation

  • Che-Lin Su, 2005. "A SNCP Method for Solving Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 150, Society for Computational Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf5:150
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Berry, Carolyn A. & Hobbs, Benjamin F. & Meroney, William A. & O'Neill, Richard P. & StewartJr, William R., 1999. "Understanding how market power can arise in network competition: a game theoretic approach," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 139-158, September.
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    4. Cardell, Judith B. & Hitt, Carrie Cullen & Hogan, William W., 1997. "Market power and strategic interaction in electricity networks," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 109-137, March.
    5. Unknown, 2005. "Forward," 2005 Conference: Slovenia in the EU - Challenges for Agriculture, Food Science and Rural Affairs, November 10-11, 2005, Moravske Toplice, Slovenia 183804, Slovenian Association of Agricultural Economists (DAES).
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    Cited by:

    1. Uday V. Shanbhag & Gerd Infanger & Peter W. Glynn, 2011. "A Complementarity Framework for Forward Contracting Under Uncertainty," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(4), pages 810-834, August.
    2. Feijoo, Felipe & Das, Tapas K., 2014. "Design of Pareto optimal CO2 cap-and-trade policies for deregulated electricity networks," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 371-383.
    3. J. S. Pang, 2007. "Partially B-Regular Optimization and Equilibrium Problems," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(3), pages 687-699, August.
    4. Fernández, Mauricio & Muñoz, Francisco D. & Moreno, Rodrigo, 2020. "Analysis of imperfect competition in natural gas supply contracts for electric power generation: A closed-loop approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multi-leader Multi-follower games; equilibrium problems; nonlinear complementarity problems;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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