IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/sal/celpdp/0145.html

Illegal Behavior in the Public Administration

Author

Listed:
  • Annamaria NESE

    (CELPE - Centre of Labour Economics and Economic Policy, University of Salerno - Italy)

  • Roberta TROISI

    (CELPE - Centre of Labour Economics and Economic Policy, University of Salerno - Italy)

Abstract

This analysis addresses the corruption of Italian mayors, and it is carried out by analyzing the sentences of the Italian Supreme Court in the last decade. The research questions are as follows: Is corruption effectively prosecuted and punished in Italy? Are there signs of social stigma or reputational damage for corrupt politicians? To this aim, we focus on i) justice efficiency and ii) social tolerance of corruption. The results reported here reveal that the probability of re-election increases in small urban areas, when the mayor is a strong leader and when he colludes with entrepreneurs external to the council, thus reinforcing the hypotheses that people vote for corrupt leaders because they receive favors from those leaders or because they perceive that those leaders are efficient in delivering public goods. The judicial system works well against organized crime, probably because of the special proceedings against "mafiosi"; however, it is more inefficient when a mayor colludes with his staff: evidently, higher efficiency may be pursued through the implementation of a stricter legal institutional framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Annamaria NESE & Roberta TROISI, 2017. "Illegal Behavior in the Public Administration," CELPE Discussion Papers 145, CELPE - CEnter for Labor and Political Economics, University of Salerno, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:sal:celpdp:0145
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.celpe.unisa.it/uploads/rescue/784/1048/dp_145.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, 2004. "The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 155-189, March.
    2. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    3. Lambsdorff,Johann Graf, 2007. "The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521872751, November.
    4. Levitt, Steven D, 1997. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 270-290, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sieger, Philip, 2013. "Job Losses and Criminal Gains: Analyzing the Effect of Unemployment on Criminal Activity," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79929, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Paolo Buonanno & Giovanni Mastrobuoni, 2012. "Police and Crime: Evidence from Dictated Delays in Centralized Police Hiring," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 244, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    3. Jens Ludwig & Jeffrey R. Kling, 2007. "Is Crime Contagious?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(3), pages 491-518.
    4. Christophe Bellégo & Joeffrey Drouard, 2019. "Does It Pay to Fight Crime? Evidence From the Pacification of Slums in Rio de Janeiro," Working Papers 2019-08, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    5. Deiana, C, 2016. "Local Labour Market Effects of Unemployment on Crime Induced by Trade Shocks," Economics Discussion Papers 16529, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    6. Damm, Anna Piil & Hassani, Ahmad & Sørensen, Jonas Søndergaard, 2025. "Place-Based Policies in Deprived Neighbourhoods: Opportunities for Preexisting Residents and Neighbourhood Revitalisation?," IZA Discussion Papers 17843, IZA Network @ LISER.
    7. Wheaton, William C., 2006. "Metropolitan fragmentation, law enforcement effort and urban crime," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 1-14, July.
    8. Birkeland, Sigbjørn & Cappelen, Alexander W. & Sørensen, Erik Ø. & Tungodden, Bertil, 2011. "Immoral criminals? An experimental study of social preferences among prisoners," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 15/2011, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    9. Anna Piil Damm & Christian Dustmann, 2014. "Does Growing Up in a High Crime Neighborhood Affect Youth Criminal Behavior?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(6), pages 1806-1832, June.
    10. Brian Bell & Stephen Machin, 2013. "Immigration and crime," Chapters, in: Amelie F. Constant & Klaus F. Zimmermann (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Migration, chapter 19, pages 353-372, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Chao Fu & Nicolás Grau & Jorge Rivera, 2022. "Wandering astray: Teenagers' choices of schooling and crime," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), pages 387-424, May.
    12. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, 2010. "Enforcement and Public Corruption: Evidence from US States," EPRU Working Paper Series 2010-08, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    13. Ryan S. Johnson & Shawn Kantor & Price V. Fishback, 2007. "Striking at the Roots of Crime: The Impact of Social Welfare Spending on Crime During the Great Depression," NBER Working Papers 12825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Price V. Fishback & Ryan S. Johnson & Shawn Kantor, 2010. "Striking at the Roots of Crime: The Impact of Welfare Spending on Crime during the Great Depression," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 715-740.
    15. Jeffrey R. Kling & Jens Ludwig & Lawrence F. Katz, 2004. "Youth Criminal Behavior in the Moving to Opportunity Experiment," Working Papers 6, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    16. Kausik Chaudhuri & Payel Chowdhury & Kevin Reilly, 2013. "A New Perspective on Violent Crime Burden Index: Evidence from Indian Districts," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 110(2), pages 771-789, January.
    17. Jason M. Lindo & Charles Stoecker, 2014. "Drawn Into Violence: Evidence On “What Makes A Criminal” From The Vietnam Draft Lotteries," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 239-258, January.
    18. Lovett, Nicholas & Xue, Yuhan, 2025. "Do greater sanctions deter youth crime? Evidence from a regression discontinuity design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
    19. Brian Bell & Rui Costa & Stephen Machin, 2022. "Why Does Education Reduce Crime?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(3), pages 732-765.
    20. Alex Raskolnikov, 2020. "Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Missing Literature," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-59.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sal:celpdp:0145. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Roberto Dell'Anno (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesalit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.