Radical Moderation: Recapturing Power in Two-party Parliamentary Systems
We estimate the parameters of a reputational game of political competition using data from five two-party parliamentary systems. We find that latent party preferences (and party reputations) persist with high probability across election periods, with one exception: parties with extreme preferences who find themselves out of power switch to moderation with higher probability than the equivalent estimated likelihood for parties in government (extreme or moderate) or for moderate parties in opposition. We find evidence for the presence of significant country-specific differences. Notably, we estimate that in the long-term, Australia is less than half as likely to experience extreme policies and Australian governments enjoy significantly longer spells in office as compared to their counterparts in Greece, Malta, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The model outperforms alternative naive models on a battery of goodness-of-fit tests.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: University of Rochester, Wallis Institute, Harkness 109B Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.|
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- Merlo, Antonio, 1997.
"Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 101-131, February.
- Merlo, A., 1992. "Bargaining Over Governments in a Stochastic Environment," Working Papers 92-55, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Merlo, Antonio, 1996. "Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment," Bulletins 7476, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Daniel Diermeier & Michael Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2005. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 347-373, March.
- Daniel Diermeier & Michael Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Sep 2004.
- Daniel Diermeier & Michael Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2004. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers," Discussion Papers 1387, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January.
- Kalandrakis, Tasos, 2009. "A Reputational Theory of Two-Party Competition," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 4(4), pages 343-378, December.
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "A Reputational Theory of Two Party Competition," Wallis Working Papers WP41, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2008. "A Reputational Theory of Two Party Competition," Wallis Working Papers WP57, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Budge, Ian, 1994. "A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology and Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(04), pages 443-467, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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