With additional enforcement mechanisms,does Collateral avoid Ponzi Schemes ?
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- Thiago Revil & Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez, 2008. "With Additional Enforcement Mechanisms, does Collateral Avoid Ponzi Schemes?," Working Papers wp278, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Steinert, Mariano & Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo, 2007. "General equilibrium in CLO markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 709-734, August.
- Páscoa, Mário Rui & Seghir, Abdelkrim, 2009. "Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 270-286, January.
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KeywordsEffective default enforcements; Collateral repossession; Individual’s optimality.;
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
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