Communication for Multi-Taskers: Perspectives on Dealing with Both Monetary Policy and Financial Stability
This paper examines the communications challenges facing central banks who will be sharing responsibilities with other agencies for macro-prudential objectives, in addition to conventional monetary policy goals. Following a description and analysis of surveys of central banks, and the attributes that make up an index of central bank transparency, some policy proposals are made. It is argued that a hybrid of inflation and price level targeting, combined with a requirement by the macro-prudential regulators to issue press releases much like central banks publish an announcement and rationale for the setting of monetary policy instruments, may improve the central bank communication in a post-crisis world.
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- Francisco Ruge-Murcia, 2014.
"Do Inflation-Targeting Central Banks Implicitly Target the Price Level?,"
International Journal of Central Banking,
International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(2), pages 301-326, June.
- RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2009. "Do Inflation-Targeting Central Banks Implicitly Target the Price Level?," Cahiers de recherche 16-2009, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2009. "Do Inflation-Targeting Central Banks Implicitly Target the Price Level?," Cahiers de recherche 2009-15, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
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