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The Effect on Asset Values of the Allocation of Carbon Dioxide Emission Allowances

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  • Burtraw, Dallas

    (Resources for the Future)

  • Palmer, Karen

    (Resources for the Future)

  • Bharvirkar, Ranjit
  • Paul, Anthony

Abstract

Paradoxically, owners of existing generation assets may be better off paying for carbon dioxide emission allowances than having them distributed for free. This analysis shows that it takes just 7.5% of the revenue raised under an auction to preserve the asset values of existing generators.

Suggested Citation

  • Burtraw, Dallas & Palmer, Karen & Bharvirkar, Ranjit & Paul, Anthony, 2002. "The Effect on Asset Values of the Allocation of Carbon Dioxide Emission Allowances," RFF Working Paper Series dp-02-15-, Resources for the Future.
    • Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-02-15-
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    File URL: http://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/RFF-DP-02-15.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Parry Ian W. H., 1995. "Pollution Taxes and Revenue Recycling," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 64-77, November.
    2. Fischer, Carolyn, 2001. "Rebating Environmental Policy Revenues: Output-Based Allocations and Tradable Performance Standards," Discussion Papers 10709, Resources for the Future.
    3. Carlo Carraro & Gilbert E. Metcalf, 2000. "Behavioral and Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy Introduction," NBER Working Papers 7648, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Burtraw, Dallas & Palmer, Karen L. & Bharvirkar, Ranjit & Paul, Anthony, 2001. "The Effect of Allowance Allocation on the Cost of Carbon Emission Trading," Discussion Papers 10536, Resources for the Future.
    5. Bovenberg, A.L. & Goulder, L.H., 1996. "Optimal environmental taxation in the presence of other taxes : General equilibrium analyses," Other publications TiSEM 5d4b7517-c5c8-4ef6-ab76-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, 2001. "Neutralizing the Adverse Industry Impacts of CO2 Abatement Policies: What Does It Cost?," NBER Chapters, in: Behavioral and Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy, pages 45-90, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Bovenberg, A Lans & Goulder, Lawrence H, 1996. "Optimal Environmental Taxation in the Presence of Other Taxes: General-Equilibrium Analyses," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 985-1000, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    carbon dioxide; emission allowance trading; allocation; electricity; restructuring; air pollution; auction; grandfathering; generation performance standard; outputbased allocation; cost-effectiveness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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