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Total Executive Compensation

  • Tom Cooley

    (New York University)

  • Sonia Di Giannatale

    (CIDE)

  • Gian Luca Clementi

    (New York University)

Registered author(s):

    contract. We focus our attention on testable implications: (i) the relationship between compensation and firm size, (ii) the relative importance of current and deferred compensation, (iii) the sensitivity of compensation to innovations in shareholder wealth, and (iv) the relationship between such sensitivity and size. Very preliminary results show that when the marginal product of managerial effort is increasing in capital, our model is consistent with facts (i), (iii), and (iv).

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    File URL: https://www.economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2008/paper_906.pdf
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    Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2008 Meeting Papers with number 906.

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    Date of creation: 2008
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    Handle: RePEc:red:sed008:906
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
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    Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
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    1. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," CESifo Working Paper Series 3277, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, 2005. "The Growth of Executive Pay," NBER Working Papers 11443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2006. "Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," 2006 Meeting Papers 518, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Spear, Stephen E & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617, October.
    5. Peter F. Kostiuk, 1990. "Firm Size and Executive Compensation," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(1), pages 90-105.
    6. Marko Tervio, 2008. "The Difference That CEOs Make: An Assignment Model Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 642-68, June.
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