Total Executive Compensation
contract. We focus our attention on testable implications: (i) the relationship between compensation and firm size, (ii) the relative importance of current and deferred compensation, (iii) the sensitivity of compensation to innovations in shareholder wealth, and (iv) the relationship between such sensitivity and size. Very preliminary results show that when the marginal product of managerial effort is increasing in capital, our model is consistent with facts (i), (iii), and (iv).
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
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- Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1997.
"Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?,"
NBER Working Papers
6213, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David R. Roberts, 1956. "A General Theory of Executive Compensation Based on Statistically Tested Propositions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 270-294.
- Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2006.
"Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?,"
2006 Meeting Papers
518, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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