The Extractive Firm's Cost Spillover Tax for the Extended Hotelling Model
We consider a competitive extraction industry comprising many small firms, each with a slightly different quality of mineral holdings. With "rapidly" declining quality of holding per firm, we observe rent declining over an interval. We then take up the familiar planning model and isolate the tax required to make decentralized extraction by many distinct, competitive firms replicate the planning solution.
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- Lozada, Gabriel A., 1993. "Existence and characterization of discrete-time equilibria in extractive industries," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 249-254, September.
- John Livernois & Patrick Martin, 2001. "Price, scarcity rent, and a modified r per cent rule for non-renewable resources," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(3), pages 827-845, August.
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