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Farsightedness in Games: Stabilizing Cooperation in International Conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Brams, Steven J.
  • Ismail, Mehmet S.

Abstract

We show that a cooperative outcome—one that is at least next-best for the players—is not a Nash equilibrium (NE) in 19 of the 57 2 x 2 strict ordinal conflict games (33%), including Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken. Auspiciously, in 16 of these games (84%), cooperative outcomes are nonmyopic equilibria (NMEs) when the players make farsighted calculations, based on backward induction; in the other three games, credible threats induce cooperation. More generally, in all finite normal-form games, if players’ preferences are strict, farsighted calculations stabilize at least one Pareto-optimal NME. We illustrate the choice of NMEs that are not NEs by two cases in international relations: (i) no first use of nuclear weapons, chosen by the protagonists in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and since adopted by some nuclear powers; and (ii) the 2015 agreement between Iran, and a coalition of the United States and other countries, that has been abrogated by the United States but has forestalled Iran’s possible development of nuclear weapons.

Suggested Citation

  • Brams, Steven J. & Ismail, Mehmet S., 2019. "Farsightedness in Games: Stabilizing Cooperation in International Conflict," MPRA Paper 91370, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:91370
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91370/1/MPRA_paper_91370.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2018. "Confronting an enemy with unknown preferences: Deterrer or provocateur?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 124-143.
    2. Brams, Steven J., 2012. "Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262518252, December.
    3. Bryan Randolph Bruns, 2015. "Names for Games: Locating 2 × 2 Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-26, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shaun Hargreaves Heap & Mehmet S. Ismail, 2021. "No-harm principle, rationality, and Pareto optimality in games," Papers 2101.10723, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
    2. Heap, Shaun Hargreaves & Ismail, Mehmet, 2021. "Liberalism, rationality, and Pareto optimality," SocArXiv mgqh7, Center for Open Science.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Farsightedness; nonmyopic equilibrium; game theory; cooperation; international conflict;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions

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