Corruption vs reforms: Why do voters prefer the former?
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More about this item
KeywordsCorruption; politician; median voter; reforms; risk aversion;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2018-11-05 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MAC-2018-11-05 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2018-11-05 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2018-11-05 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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