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Conditions institutionnelles de la malédiction des ressources naturelles en Afrique sur les performances économiques
[Institutional conditions of the natural resource curse in Africa on economic performance]

Author

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  • Tcheta-Bampa, Albert
  • Kodila-Tedika, Oasis

Abstract

We show that if Africa is subject to the curse of natural resources it is because this continent has generally been organized since the European colonization on the basis of extractive institutions that determines the strong conflicts between the economic preferences of the political decision-makers and those of the rest of society. In particular, we show that the quality of institutions in African countries is fundamentally determined by historical factors. The main originality is that it uses as an instrumental variable, the institutional path dependence that ensures that there is a curse of natural resources only in countries where the extractive institutions of colonialism have been reproduced. We provide evidence that the overall impact of institutions and natural resource dependence on economic performance is critically dependent on past events as these determine the incentive structure and future institutional choices. The phenomenon of the curse is decreasing in Africa as we move away from the end of the Cold War.

Suggested Citation

  • Tcheta-Bampa, Albert & Kodila-Tedika, Oasis, 2018. "Conditions institutionnelles de la malédiction des ressources naturelles en Afrique sur les performances économiques [Institutional conditions of the natural resource curse in Africa on economic pe," MPRA Paper 86511, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:86511
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    Cited by:

    1. Oasis Kodila-Tedika, 2021. "Natural resource governance: does social media matter?," Mineral Economics, Springer;Raw Materials Group (RMG);Luleå University of Technology, vol. 34(1), pages 127-140, April.
    2. Tcheta-Bampa, Tcheta-Bampa & Kodila-Tedika, Oasis, 2018. "Dynamisation de la malédiction des ressources naturelles en Afrique sur les performances économiques : institution et guerre froide [Curse of Natural Resources and Economic Performance in Africa: I," MPRA Paper 86510, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Colonialisme européen; institutions; ressources naturelles; malédiction des ressources; droits de propriété; Indépendance; croissance économique.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B2 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925
    • B22 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Macroeconomics
    • C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Hypothesis Testing: General
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights

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