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Debt, equity, universal banking and Islamic finance: note

Author

Listed:
  • Hasan, Zubair

Abstract

This brief note looks at the suggested use of universal banking as a tool to mitigating risk in financing operations’ arising at both ends of the market – demand and supply. It concludes that the issue of adopting universal banking in the Islamic system is of little significance for risk reduction. It essentially raises the issue of mega banks versus smaller units in the Islamic system where the discretion would opt for the latter.

Suggested Citation

  • Hasan, Zubair, 2018. "Debt, equity, universal banking and Islamic finance: note," MPRA Paper 86292, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:86292
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hasan, Zubair, 2016. "Risk-sharing the sole basis of Islamic finance? time for a serious rethink," MPRA Paper 72252, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Apr 2018.
    2. Calomiris,Charles W., 2000. "U.S. Bank Deregulation in Historical Perspective," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521583626, January.
    3. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka & Chi-Wa Yuen, 1998. "Capital Flows with Debt-And Equity-Financed Invesment: Equilibrium Structure and Efficiency Implications," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 136, Universidad del CEMA.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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