The Great Banks` Depression - Deposit Withdrawals in the German Crisis of 1931
Using monthly balance-sheet data of all major German credit banks, we analyze deposit withdrawals and bank failures in the German banking and currency crisis of 1931. We show that deposit withdrawals were related to indicators of banks' liquidity and solvency and were hence not simply the consequence of a run on the German currency. We find no evidence that branch banks were more stable than unit banks. Finally, we show that larger banks had a lower probability of failure, were more likely to be bailed out by the public authorities, and were granted preferential access to the Reichsbank's discount window. We interpret these results as evidence for a 'too-big-to-fail' phenomenon.
|Date of creation:||11 Dec 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||I would like to thank Reinhold Schnabel for very helpful discussions in the early stages of this project. Moreover, I thank Jochen Bigus, Christoph Buchheim, Mark Carlson, Martin Hellwig, Hans-Joachim Voth, David Wheelock and the participants of the Annual Meeting of the Cliometric Society in Raleigh, the Banking Workshop in Muenster, the Annual Meeting of the European Economic Association in Stockholm, the Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association in Nashville, the Annual Meeting of the Verein fuer Socialpolitik in Zuerich as well as seminar participants at Pompeu Fabra and the University of Mannheim for useful comments and suggestions.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (49) (0) 621-292-2547
Fax: (49) (0) 621-292-5594
Web page: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/
More information through EDIRC
Web page: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Schnabel, Isabel, 2004.
"The German Twin Crisis of 1931,"
The Journal of Economic History,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(03), pages 822-871, September.
- Mark Carlson, 2004.
"Are Branch Banks Better Survivors? Evidence from the Depression Era,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(1), pages 111-126, January.
- Mark Carlson, 2001. "Are branch banks better survivors? Evidence from the Depression era," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-51, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason, 2001.
"Causes of U.S. bank distress during the depression,"
714, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason, 2000. "Causes of U.S. Bank Distress During the Depression," NBER Working Papers 7919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Peter Temin, 1991. "Lessons from the Great Depression," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262700441, June.
- Grossman, Richard S., 1994. "The Shoe That Didn't Drop: Explaining Banking Stability During the Great Depression," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(03), pages 654-682, September.
- Calomiris, Charles W & Kahn, Charles M, 1991. "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 497-513, June.
- White, Eugene Nelson, 1984. "A Reinterpretation of the Banking Crisis of 1930," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(01), pages 119-138, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:03-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Carsten Schmidt)The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Carsten Schmidt to update the entry or send us the correct address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.