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Interdomain routing and games

Author

Listed:
• Levin, Hagay
• Schapira, Michael
• Zohar, Aviv

Abstract

We present a game-theoretic model that captures many of the intricacies of \emph{interdomain routing} in today's Internet. In this model, the strategic agents are source nodes located on a network, who aim to send traffic to a unique destination node. The interaction between the agents is dynamic and complex -- asynchronous, sequential, and based on partial information. Best-reply dynamics in this model capture crucial aspects of the only interdomain routing protocol de facto, namely the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). We study complexity and incentive-related issues in this model. Our main results are showing that in realistic and well-studied settings, BGP is incentive-compatible. I.e., not only does myopic behaviour of all players \emph{converge} to a stable'' routing outcome, but no player has motivation to unilaterally deviate from the protocol. Moreover, we show that even \emph{coalitions} of players of \emph{any} size cannot improve their routing outcomes by collaborating. Unlike the vast majority of works in mechanism design, our results do not require any monetary transfers (to or by the agents).

Suggested Citation

• Levin, Hagay & Schapira, Michael & Zohar, Aviv, 2008. "Interdomain routing and games," MPRA Paper 8476, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8476
as

File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8476/1/MPRA_paper_8476.pdf
File Function: original version

References listed on IDEAS

as
1. Nisan, Noam & Ronen, Amir, 2001. "Algorithmic Mechanism Design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 166-196, April.
2. Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour, 2006. "The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Nash Equilibrium Procedures," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001299, UCLA Department of Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Keywords

Interdomain Routing; Network Games; BGP protocol;

JEL classification:

• D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
• D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
• D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

NEP fields

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