Proving Arrow’s theorem by PROLOG
This paper presented a simple PROLOG implementation for Arrow’s Social welfare function (SWF). Arrow (Social choice and individual values, Yale University Press, 1963) proved that any SWF which satisfies a set of conditions IIA, Pareto, and unrestricted domain should be dictatorial. The PROLOG program can prove the theorem for 3-alternative 2-agent case. With a minor modification it proves a version of the theorem without the Pareto condition by Wilson (Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 478–486, 1972). Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
Volume (Year): 30 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
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- Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
- Nisan, Noam & Ronen, Amir, 2001. "Algorithmic Mechanism Design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 166-196, April.
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