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Proving Arrow’s theorem by PROLOG

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  • Kenryo Indo

Abstract

This paper presented a simple PROLOG implementation for Arrow’s Social welfare function (SWF). Arrow (Social choice and individual values, Yale University Press, 1963) proved that any SWF which satisfies a set of conditions IIA, Pareto, and unrestricted domain should be dictatorial. The PROLOG program can prove the theorem for 3-alternative 2-agent case. With a minor modification it proves a version of the theorem without the Pareto condition by Wilson (Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 478–486, 1972). Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Kenryo Indo, 2007. "Proving Arrow’s theorem by PROLOG," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 57-63, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:compec:v:30:y:2007:i:1:p:57-63
    DOI: 10.1007/s10614-007-9086-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nisan, Noam & Ronen, Amir, 2001. "Algorithmic Mechanism Design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 166-196, April.
    2. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
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