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Uniformly bounded sufficient sets and quasi‐extreme social welfare functions

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  • Donald E. Campbell
  • Jerry S. Kelly

Abstract

The set of alternatives is infinite. If the social welfare function is transitive‐valued and minimal sufficient sets are uniformly bounded, then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of the feasible set, and a rich sub‐domain of profiles, within which a reduction in the scope of someone's dictatorial power must be accompanied by an equal increase in the fraction of the pairs that are socially ordered without consulting anyone's preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2010. "Uniformly bounded sufficient sets and quasi‐extreme social welfare functions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 6(4), pages 405-412, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:6:y:2010:i:4:p:405-412
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2010.00139.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2013. "Uniformly bounded sufficient sets and quasitransitive social choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 31-35.

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