Upward Pricing Pressure Formulations with Logit Demand and Endogenous Partial Acquisitions
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsDifferentiated Product Markets; GUPPI; Logit Demand; Endogenous Partial Acquisitions;
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-COM-2015-08-30 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GER-2015-08-30 (German Papers)
- NEP-IND-2015-08-30 (Industrial Organization)
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