Why People Tolerate Underground Economy and Tax Evasion?
An answer to this question is provided on the basis of a game-theoretic analysis connected methodologically with an intertemporal maximization model since a game played repeatedly over time, brings forward for consideration the present value of a sequence of payoffs. An optimal control problem arises for each individual, a problem that has to take into account the uncertainty stemming from the playing of mixed strategies. The result is that all of us cheat at least a little bit the state, and that we may not be sure that the state does not want us to do so: underground economy and/or tax evasion may be a necessary evil whenever they stabilize the economy and whenever they aid economic development.
|Date of creation:||1995|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- LÃ©onard,Daniel & Long,Ngo van, 1992.
"Optimal Control Theory and Static Optimization in Economics,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521331586, December.
- LÃ©onard,Daniel & Long,Ngo van, 1992. "Optimal Control Theory and Static Optimization in Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521337465, December.
- Anand, Paul, 1995. "Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198774426.
- Lemieux, Thomas & Fortin, Bernard & Frechette, Pierre, 1994. "The Effect of Taxes on Labor Supply in the Underground Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 231-254, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:58545. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.