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On the Synchronisation of Elections: A Differential Games Approach

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  • António Caleiro

    (Department of Economics, University of Évora)

Abstract

The paper offers an analysis of the issues related to the election dates synchronisation between two countries. The first purpose of the paper is to analyse the circumstances in which a government of a single country, considered to be a small economy, has incentives, or not, to synchronise the domestic election dates with the election dates (not necessarily determined in an endogenous way) of a country performing the role of an ?anchor?, considered to be a big economy. To achieve this purpose, the paper uses an asymmetric version of MILLER and SALMON?s (1990) model in order to derive the optimal domestic electoral period length, which, in this sense, can be said to be endogenously determined. The second main purpose of the paper is to re-analyse the situation being studied by considering that the foreign government also determines its election dates in an optimal way, this leading to a differential game played by the two incumbents from which incentives to totally synchronise the election dates may result. The paper shows that the interests of both economies in what concerns the existing electoral period length in the other economy are not always compatible.

Suggested Citation

  • António Caleiro, 2006. "On the Synchronisation of Elections: A Differential Games Approach," Economics Working Papers 05_2006, University of Évora, Department of Economics (Portugal).
    • Handle: RePEc:evo:wpecon:05_2006
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10174/8437
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Miller, Marcus & Salmon, Mark, 1990. "When does coordination pay?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(3-4), pages 553-569, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Differential Games; Electoral business cycles; Election dates; Mandates durations; Synchronisation of elections;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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