On the Synchronisation of Elections: A Differential Games Approach
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- Caleiro, António, 2006. "On the Synchronisation of Elections -- A differential Games Approach," EconStor Preprints 142775, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsDifferential Games; Electoral business cycles; Election dates; Mandates durations; Synchronisation of elections;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-02-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-02-26 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2006-02-26 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MAC-2006-02-26 (Macroeconomics)
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