Partisan Effects in Economies with Variable Electoral Terms
In fixed-time electoral economies, partisan surprises are associated with a change in government as in Alberto Alesina (1987). This paper models additional partisan surprises present in variable-electoral-term economies due to the timing of the change in government. Two versions of the model are presented, one in which the timing of the change is exogenous and one in which it is endogenous. The model is interesting as it provides an explanation of movements in expected inflation, output, and employment in all periods, not just those immediately after an election as in fixed-electoral-term models. Copyright 1991 by Ohio State University Press.
Volume (Year): 23 (1991)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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