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Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures

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  • Ojo, Marianne

Abstract

This paper not only considers why many concentrated ownership structured systems and jurisdictions are considering a shift to the Anglo American style of corporate governance, but also explores why the traditional principal agency theory model may no longer apply in many concentrated ownership structures.

Suggested Citation

  • Ojo, Marianne, 2013. "Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures," MPRA Paper 50832, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:50832
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50832/1/MPRA_paper_50832.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yener Altunbaş & Alper Kara & Adrian van Rixtel, 2007. "Corporate governance and corporate ownership: The investment behaviour of Japanese institutional investors," Occasional Papers 0703, Banco de España;Occasional Papers Homepage.
    2. Joy Jia & Mike Adams & Mike Buckle, 2012. "Insurance and ownership structure in India’s corporate sector," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 129-149, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    principal agent theory; stakeholder theory; informational asymmetries; risk; corporate governance; UK; India; Germany; U.S; Japan;

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

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