A model of deliberative and aggregative democracy
We present a model of collective decision making in which aggregation and deliberation are treated simultaneously. In our model, individuals debate in a public forum and potentially revise their judgements in light of deliberation. Once this process is exhausted, a rule is applied to aggregate post-deliberation judgements in order to make a social choice. Restricting attention to three alternatives, we identify conditions under which a democracy is “truth-revealing”. This condition says that the deliberation path and the aggregation rule always lead to the correct social choice being made, irrespective of the original profile of judgements and irrespective of the size of the electorate (provided the latter is finite).
|Date of creation:||23 Aug 2012|
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- Christian List & Ben Polak, 2010.
"Introduction to Judgment Aggregation,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000006, David K. Levine.
- Christian List & Ben Polak, 2010. "Introduction to judgment aggregation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 27900, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Christian List & Ben Polak, 2010. "Introduction to Judgment Aggregation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1753, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- John List & Matti Liski, 2005. "Introduction," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(2), pages 121-121, 06.
- List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
- Christian Papinot & Mircea Vultur, 2010. "Introduction," Post-Print hal-00671054, HAL.
- N. Lesca, 2010. "Introduction," Post-Print halshs-00640602, HAL.
- Broome, John, 2006.
Oxford University Press, number 9780199297702, July.
- Gaertner,Wulf, 2006.
"Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521028745.
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