Uncertainty, trade integration and the optimal level of protection in a Ricardian model with a continuum of goods
This paper analyzes how increasing trade integration affects individual utility when the international specialization pattern is stochastic, i.e. when the number of varieties each country produces depends on the realization of a random variable. I employ a Ricardian continuum of goods model to show that in this case a trade off emerges. As in the standard model, higher trade integration reduces prices and increases expected real income. However, higher trade integration, reducing the number of active sectors in the economy, also increases the displacement cost the worker would suffer in a bad state (i.e. when the sector she is employed into has to close down because, ex-post, the foreign country’s competing sector results to be more efficient). The main result of the model is that there exists an optimal level of protection that it is higher the smaller the price reduction induced by trade integration and the more technologically similar are countries.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wacziarg, Romain & Imbs, Jean, 2000.
"Stages of Diversification,"
1653, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Tom Krebs & Pravin Krishna, 2005.
"Trade Policy, Income Risk and Welfare,"
2005 Meeting Papers
271, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Tom Krebs & Pravin Krishna & William Maloney, 2005. "Trade Policy, Income Risk, and Welfare," NBER Working Papers 11255, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Krebs, tom & Krishna, Pravin & Maloney, William, 2005. "Trade policy, income risk, and welfare," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3622, The World Bank.
- Tom Krebs & Pravin Krishna & William Maloney, 2004. "Trade Policy, Income Risk, and Welfare," Working Papers 2004-09, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Hausmann, Ricardo & Klinger, Bailey, 2006. "Structural Transformation and Patterns of Comparative Advantage in the Product Space," Working Paper Series rwp06-041, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Rodrik, Dani, 1996.
"Why do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1388, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 997-1032, October.
- Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," NBER Working Papers 5537, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonathan Eaton & Samuel Kortum, 2002. "Technology, Geography, and Trade," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1741-1779, September.
- Newbery, David M G & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Pareto Inferior Trade," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 1-12, January.
- Helpman, Elhanan & Razin, Assaf, 1978. "A theory of international trade under uncertainty," MPRA Paper 22112, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1985.
"Tariffs as Insurance: Optimal Commercial Policy When Domestic Markets Are Incomplete,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 18(2), pages 258-72, May.
- Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1981. "Tariffs as Insurance: Optimal Commercial Policy When Domestic Markets Are Incomplete," NBER Working Papers 0797, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brainard, William C. & Cooper, Richard N., 1968. "Uncertainty and Diversification in International Trade," Food Research Institute Studies, Stanford University, Food Research Institute, issue 03.
- Pagano Ugo & Samuel Bowles, 2003.
"Economic Integration, Cultural Standardization,and the Politics of Social Insurance,"
wp64, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
- Samuel Bowles & Ugo Pagano, 2003. "Economic Integration, Cultural Standardization and the Politics of Social Insurance," Department of Economics University of Siena 408, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Dornbusch, Rudiger & Fischer, Stanley & Samuelson, Paul A, 1977.
"Comparative Advantage, Trade, and Payments in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 67(5), pages 823-39, December.
- R. Dornbusch & S. Fischer & P. A. Samuelson, 1976. "Comparative Advantage, Trade and Payments in a Ricardian Model With a Continuum of Goods," Working papers 178, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Dani Rodrik, 1997. "Trade, Social Insurance, and the Limits to Globalization," NBER Working Papers 5905, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Luca De Benedictis & Marco Gallegati & Massimo Tamberi, 2007. "Semiparametric analysis of the specialization-income relationship," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(4), pages 301-306.
- Dani Rodrik, 1997. "Has Globalization Gone Too Far?," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 57, December.
- Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
- S. Lael Brainard, 1991. "Protecting Losers: Optimal Diversification, Insurance, and Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 3773, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4645. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.