Backdating, tax evasion, and the unintended consequences of Canadian tax reform
In 1984 and 2000, significant changes were made to the tax treatment of employee stock options in Canada. Although designed to increase the use of stock options as a compensation vehicle (1984) and decease the loss of knowledge workers (2000), we argue that these tax changes were largely ineffective and perhaps unneeded. Further we demonstrate the negative unintended consequences of these actions, specifically that they reward the backdating of employee stock options and promote tax evasion, and discuss the policy implications of these unintended consequences.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Publication status:||Published in Tax Notes International 9.59(2010): pp. 671|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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