The Dating Game: Do Managers Designate Option Grant Dates to Increase their Compensation?
We provide evidence of two variants of a dating game that entails picking a grant date ex post, that is, after the board's compensation decision is made: back-dating (picking a date before the board decision date), and forward-dating (waiting after the board decision date to observe the stock price behavior). Consistent with back-dating, we find stock return behavior around the grant date to be positively related to reporting lag. In the promptly reported sample, we find stock return behavior and the pattern of reporting lags consistent with forward-dating. Our calculations show that managers can obtain economically significant benefits by playing the dating game. , Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 21 (2008)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
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