“Better an egg today than a hen tomorrow?” On the implications of deaccess policies on donations to museums
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- Luigi Di Gaetano & Isidoro Mazza, 2017. "“Better an egg today than a hen tomorrow” on the implications of deaccess policies for donations to museums," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 41(3), pages 237-258, August.
- Luigi Di Gaetano & Isidoro Mazza, 2014. "Better an egg today than a hen tomorrow: On the implications of deaccess policies on donations to museums," ACEI Working Paper Series AWP-01-2014, Association for Cultural Economics International, revised Apr 2014.
References listed on IDEAS
- Towse,Ruth, 2010. "A Textbook of Cultural Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521888721, May.
- Harbaugh, William T., 1998. "What do donations buy?: A model of philanthropy based on prestige and warm glow," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 269-284, February.
- Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2007.
"The Effect Of Rewards And Sanctions In Provision Of Public Goods,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 671-690, October.
- Martin Sefton & Robert S. Shupp & James Walker, 2005. "The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers 200504, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2005.
- Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2006. "The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods," Caepr Working Papers 2006-005, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington, revised Aug 2006.
- Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-477, June.
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More about this item
KeywordsDeaccessioning; Museums financing policy; sequential game; moral hazard;
- Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-07-01 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-CUL-2012-07-01 (Cultural Economics)
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