Evolution towards efficient coordination in repeated games, preliminary version
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References listed on IDEAS
- Binmore,Ken Samuelson,Larry, "undated". "Evolutionary stability in repeated games Played by finite automata," Discussion Paper Serie B 193, University of Bonn, Germany.
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"An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication,"
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More about this item
KeywordsRepeated Games; Evolution; Communication; Efficiency;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2012-06-25 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-06-25 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-06-25 (Microeconomics)
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