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Traditional sufficient conditions for Nash implementation may fail on Internet


  • Wu, Haoyang


The Maskin's theorem is a fundamental work in the theory of mechanism design. In this paper, we propose that if agents report messages to the designer through channels (\emph{e.g.}, Internet), agents can construct a self-enforcing agreement such that any Pareto-inefficient social choice rule satisfying monotonicity and no-veto will not be Nash implementable when an additional condition is satisfied. The key points are: 1) The agreement is unobservable to the designer, and the designer cannot prevent the agents from constructing such agreement; 2) The agents act non-cooperatively, and the Maskin mechanism remain unchanged from the designer's perspective.

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  • Wu, Haoyang, 2012. "Traditional sufficient conditions for Nash implementation may fail on Internet," MPRA Paper 39268, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:39268

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    2. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
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    Mechanism design; Nash implementation; Social choice;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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