[The Effects of Market Competition, Managerial Incentives and Shareholders' Rights on Corporate Governance: Empirical Analysis Based on China's Listed Retail Firms]
This paper, using the total factor productivity in the Cobb-Douglas production function, empirically investigates into the effects of market competition, managerial incentives and shareholders' rights on corporate governance under the framework of pooled OLS and fixed effects regression method. In this paper, I find that (1) there exists a complementary relation between shareholders' rights and managerial incentives in terms of corporate governance and (2) the effect of shareholders' rights on corporate governance is dependent on market competition. The more intense the market competition, the less shareholders' rights contribute to better governance, and vice versa. These findings provide some new views to the study of corporate governance.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2012|
|Date of revision:||May 2012|
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