Governance codes and types of issuer. An empirical research on a global sample
We study the relationship between the types of issuer and the governance codes contents in the neo-institutional social theory perspective, using a global sample of over 70 national governance codes. We hypothesize that the code recommendations are influenced by the nature of isomorphic pressure to embrace new social practices, exerted by the different types of issuer. The findings show that codes issued involving multiple stakeholders’ groups and organizations into hybrid committees are more likely to: (1) include recommendations that take into account multiple political and social institutional demands; (2) adapt the mainstream agency-theory-based governance model to the national setting features. Overall, the policy-making negotiations among different stakeholders’ groups in the local institutional setting appear to be determinant in shaping the code recommendations and in improving the promotion of good governance practices among firms. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to systematically investigate the relationship between the types of issuer and the codes contents.
|Date of creation:||05 Apr 2012|
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