Estimation of the Equilibrium Interest Rate: Case of CFA zone
Problem Statement The framework of this study is consisted of the countries of zone CFA and in fact the two central banks (BCEAO and BEAC) in charge of the monetary policy implementation. There was a great resurgence of interest these last years on the question in the way of leading the monetary policy. One of the indicators of this phenomenon is the enormous volume of recent papers and the conferences prepared on this subject. In addition, much of macro economists proposed specific rules of policy or ruled on the way in which the monetary policy should be led. The principal objective of this study is the evaluation of the macroeconomic gold rule in the CFA countries which stipulates that in an economy with equilibrium growth and under simplifying macroeconomic assumptions: the neutral interest rate is equal to the potential growth rate of the economy. Research Method To achieve this objective we try to determine the weight of the goals of monetary and fiscal policies attaches with a quadratic reaction function which takes into account a target of inflation, public expenditure and interest rate. And then the methodology of determination of the neutral interest rate is derived from a generalized Taylor rule. The estimation of the parameters is based on panel data econometrics, the generalized method of moments and the Kalman filter. These different methods are used to emphasize the robustness of the results of our analysis. Results and conclusion The estimates carried out on the panel data emphasize a neutral interest rate in the interval of 1.4% to 1.6%. It is generally noticed that the estimates made on the panel data are compatible with those carried out by using the Kalman filter. In addition, it is observed that, overall the level of the natural interest rate in UEMOA zone (1.51) is lower than CEMAC zone (1.65). The most important neutral rate is observed in the Malian economy and the lowest in the Burkina economy. But we notice a larger homogeneity in CEMAC zone (standard deviation of 0.12) than UEMOA zone ( standard deviation of 0.29).
|Date of creation:||18 Jun 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Svensson, Lars E.O., 1998.
"Open-Economy Inflation Targeting,"
638, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Svensson, Lars E O, 1998. "Open-Economy Inflation Targeting," CEPR Discussion Papers 1989, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Open-Economy Inflation Targeting," Papers 638, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Lars E. O. Svensson, 2000. "Open-Economy Inflation Targeting," NBER Working Papers 6545, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1997.
"Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some International Evidence,"
NBER Working Papers
6254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Clarida, Richard & Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1998. "Monetary policy rules in practice Some international evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 1033-1067, June.
- Clarida, Richard & Galí, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1997. "Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some International Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1750, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Clarida, Richard & Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1997. "Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some International Evidence," Working Papers 97-32, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Huchet-Bourdon, Marilyne, 2003.
"Fonctions de réaction des banques centrales européennes et convergence,"
Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 79(3), pages 297-326, Septembre.
- Marilyne Huchet-Bourdon, 2003. "Fonctions de réaction des banques centrales européennes et convergence," Post-Print halshs-00143784, HAL.
- Frank Smets, 1998.
"Output gap uncertainty: does it matter for the Taylor rule?,"
BIS Working Papers
60, Bank for International Settlements.
- Frank Smets, 2002. "Output gap uncertainty: Does it matter for the Taylor rule?," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 113-129.
- Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 2000.
"Inflation Dynamics: A Structural Econometric Analysis,"
NBER Working Papers
7551, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1999. "Inflation dynamics: A structural econometric analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 195-222, October.
- Jordi Galí & Mark Gertler, 1998. "Inflation dynamics: A structural econometric analysis," Economics Working Papers 341, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Sharon Kozicki, 1999. "How useful are Taylor rules for monetary policy?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q II, pages 5-33.
- John B. Taylor, 1999. "Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number tayl99-1, October.
- Rudi Dornbusch & Carlo Favero & Francesco Giavazzi, 1998. "Immediate challenges for the European Central Bank," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 15-64, 04.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
- Rudiger Dornbusch & Carlo A. Favero & Francesco Giavazzi, 1998. "The Immediate Challenges for the European Central Bank," NBER Working Papers 6369, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:3610. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.