Asymmetric information in the civil wars, the Colombian case
The aim of this paper is to interpret the relationships between information networks and the armed conflict in Colombia. Over a period of paramilitary violence networks of informants were used with a strategic purpose. In fact, the paramilitaries were preparing each slaughter counting information previously learned between the inhabitants of the town. For these reasons, it is shown that information is a key phenomenon to understand civil wars. Moreover, as demonstrated in this work is the evolution of the slaughter in the civil wars as a result of rumor and information.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:||2011|
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- Elster, Jon, 1996. "Rationality and the Emotions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1386-97, September.
- Estrada, Fernando, 2005.
"Estado mínimo, agencias de protección y control territorial
[Minimum State, control agencies and Territorial protection]," MPRA Paper 20172, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Jan 2010.
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