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Asymmetric information in the civil wars, the Colombian case

Author

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  • Estrada, Fernando

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to interpret the relationships between information networks and the armed conflict in Colombia. Over a period of paramilitary violence networks of informants were used with a strategic purpose. In fact, the paramilitaries were preparing each slaughter counting information previously learned between the inhabitants of the town. For these reasons, it is shown that information is a key phenomenon to understand civil wars. Moreover, as demonstrated in this work is the evolution of the slaughter in the civil wars as a result of rumor and information.

Suggested Citation

  • Estrada, Fernando, 2010. "Asymmetric information in the civil wars, the Colombian case," MPRA Paper 34972, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2011.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:34972
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34972/1/MPRA_paper_34972.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Estrada, Fernando, 2005. "Estado mínimo, agencias de protección y control territorial
      [Minimum State, control agencies and Territorial protection]
      ," MPRA Paper 20172, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Jan 2010.
    2. Elster, Jon, 1996. "Rationality and the Emotions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1386-1397, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Colombia; civil wars; massacres; paramilitary; information and rumors; communication;

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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