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Redistribution through tax evasion


  • Adam, Antonis
  • Kammas, Pantelis


Using a simple model of income redistribution, we show that the government may use tax evasion as a way to redistribute income from the non- evaders to evaders. This will result then to a negative association between income inequality and per capita transfers and inefficiently high taxes.

Suggested Citation

  • Adam, Antonis & Kammas, Pantelis, 2011. "Redistribution through tax evasion," MPRA Paper 34803, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:34803

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Schneider, Friedrich, 2005. "Shadow economies around the world: what do we really know?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 598-642, September.
    2. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, May.
    3. Perotti, Roberto, 1996. "Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 149-187, June.
    4. Rainald Borck, 2009. "Voting on redistribution with tax evasion," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 439-454, March.
    5. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-927, October.
    6. Creedy, John, 1977. "Pareto and the Distribution of Income," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 23(4), pages 405-411, December.
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    More about this item


    redistribution; inequality; tax evasion;

    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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