Economic models of consumer protection policies
This paper summarizes some of my recent work on consumer protection. I present three theoretical models which illustrate the merits and drawbacks of a number of common consumer protection policies, namely: policies which prevent firms from setting unduly high prices; policies which prevent firms requiring on-the-spot decision making by prospective customers, and policies which prevent suppliers from paying commission payments to sales intermediaries.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2011|
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- Mark Armstrong & John Vickers & Jidong Zhou, 2009.
"Consumer Protection and the Incentive to Become Informed,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 7(2-3), pages 399-410, 04-05.
- Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John & Zhou, Jidong, 2008. "Consumer protection and the incentive to become informed," MPRA Paper 9898, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Armstrong, Mark, 2008.
"Interactions between competition and consumer policy,"
7258, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mark Armstrong, 2008. "Interactions between Competition and Consumer Policy," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 4.
- Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, 2003.
"Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1703-1729, December.
- Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, 2001. "Price ceilings as focal points for tacit collusion: evidence from credit cards," Working Paper Series WP-01-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Fershtman, C. & Fishman, A., 1991.
"The "Perverse" Effects of Wage and Price Controls in Search Markets,"
11-91, Tel Aviv.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Fishman, Arthur, 1994. "The 'perverse' effects of wage and price controls in search markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1099-1112, May.
- Burdett, Kenneth & Judd, Kenneth L, 1983. "Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 955-69, July.
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