Cyclical and constant strategies in renewable resources extraction
This paper is concerned with the classic topic of intertemporal resource economics: the optimal harvesting of renewable natural resources over time by one and several resource owners with conflicting interests. The traditional management model, dating back to Plourde (1970), is extended towards a two–state model in which harvesting equipment is treated as a stock variable. As a consequence of this extension, an equilibrium dynamics with bifurcations and limit cycles occur. Next we discuss conflicts as a game with two types of players involved: the traditional fishermen armed with the basic equipment and the heavy equipment users. Both players have a common depletion function, thought as harvesting, which is dependent both on personal effort and on intensity of equipment’s usage.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2011|
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- Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, November.
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- Berck, Peter, 1981. "Optimal management of renewable resources with growing demand and stock externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 105-117, June.
- H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124.
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