The Canada economic action plan as electoral tool
This paper models the distribution of pork barrel when the electoral benefit of pork does not accrue to the party in power but to the incumbent of the district where the pork was directed. The model shows that, under certain parametres, more pork goes to core support districts. To verify this claim empirically, I first study the distribution of projects undertaken in the scope of the 2009-2011 Canada Economic Action Plan, and find that districts supporting the party in power received more pork than opposition districts controlling for socio-economic characteristics of electoral districts and those of its representative in Parliament. Second, taking into account the missing variable bias, this paper also shows that the allocation of projects played a positive role in the reelection of the district incumbent party in 2011.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2011|
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