The Participation Gap: Evidence from Compulsory Voting Laws
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Other versions of this item:
- Domink Hangartner & Lukas Schmid, 2010. "The Participation Gap Evidence from Compulsory Voting Laws," Diskussionsschriften dp1101, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
References listed on IDEAS
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
- Stephen Coate & Michael Conlin, 2004. "A Group Rule–Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1476-1504, December.
More about this item
KeywordsCompulsory Voting; Voter Turnout; Structural Voting Models;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-02-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2011-02-12 (Positive Political Economics)
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