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Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale
[Regulation of a duopoly and environmental R&D]

Author

Listed:
  • Ben Youssef, Slim
  • Dinar, Zeineb

Abstract

We develop a three stage game model composed of a regulator and two firms. These firms compete on the same market where they offer the same homogeneous good, and can invest in R&D to lower their emission/output ratio. By means of a tax per-unit of pollution and a subsidy per-unit of R&D level, the regulator can induce the first best outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Ben Youssef, Slim & Dinar, Zeineb, 2009. "Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale
    [Regulation of a duopoly and environmental R&D]
    ," MPRA Paper 22385, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Apr 2010.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:22385
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22385/1/MPRA_paper_22385.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-1137, December.
    2. Farzin, Y H & Kort, P M, 2000. " Pollution Abatement Investment When Environmental Regulation Is Uncertain," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(2), pages 183-212.
    3. Jung, Chulho & Krutilla, Kerry & Boyd, Roy, 1996. "Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 95-111, January.
    4. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1990. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Erratum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 641-642, June.
    5. Slim Ben Youssef, 2009. "Transboundary pollution, R&D spillovers and international trade," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 43(1), pages 235-250, March.
    6. Stranlund, John K., 1997. "Public Technological Aid to Support Compliance to Environmental Standards," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 228-239, November.
    7. Fischer, Carolyn & Newell, Richard G., 2008. "Environmental and technology policies for climate mitigation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 142-162, March.
    8. Ben Youssef, Slim & Zaccour, Georges, 2014. "Absorptive Capacity, R&D Spillovers, Emissions Taxes and R&D Subsidies," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 4(1), pages 41-58, April.
    9. Milliman, Scott R. & Prince, Raymond, 1989. "Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 247-265, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Duopole; Taxe d'émission; Subvention de R&D; Optimum de premier ordre.;

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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