На Пути К Новой Теории Реформ
[Towards a New Theory of Reform]
Recent studies of processes of economic reforms testified that realization of liberal school recipes resulted in nonadequate losses. Basing on these studies,the author singles out a number of fundamental mistakes of the neoliberal conception. The neoliberals ignored costs of institutional transformations; they thought that creation of the market law framework was sufficient to form efficient institutions; they overestimated the role of macroeconomic policy to the detriment of institutional development; they did not consider possibilities of "institutional conflicts" as a result of institutional borrowing from other cultures; they did not take into account that efficient state is necessary for reforms to be successful. The theory of transition economies is now itself in transition to a new understanding of goals, possibilities, and technologies of reforms. Using the analysis conducted, the author outlines the most important directions of necessary transformations of Russian economic institutions.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Economics of Contemporary Russia 3 (1999): pp. 32-48|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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