Институциональные Ловушки И Экономические Реформы
[Institutional Traps and Economic Reforms]
The theory of institutional traps, i.e. ineffective but stable institutions or behavior norms, is develope din connection with economic reforms. Mechanisms are described that cause a system to get into a trap and ways of going out of it are analyzed. Concepts of transformation costs and trasitional rents are introduced. As examples of institutional traps, considered are such institutions, as barter, non-payments, tax evasion, and corruption. A game-theoretic model of the barter trap is given.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Economics and Mathematical Methods 2.35(1999): pp. 1-37|
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Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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