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Институциональные Ловушки И Экономические Реформы
[Institutional Traps and Economic Reforms]

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Abstract

The theory of institutional traps, i.e. ineffective but stable institutions or behavior norms, is develope din connection with economic reforms. Mechanisms are described that cause a system to get into a trap and ways of going out of it are analyzed. Concepts of transformation costs and trasitional rents are introduced. As examples of institutional traps, considered are such institutions, as barter, non-payments, tax evasion, and corruption. A game-theoretic model of the barter trap is given.

Suggested Citation

  • Polterovich, Victor, 1999. "Институциональные Ловушки И Экономические Реформы
    [Institutional Traps and Economic Reforms]
    ," MPRA Paper 27257, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:27257
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27257/1/MPRA_paper_27257.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean Tirole, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22.
    2. David, Paul A, 1985. "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 332-337, May.
    3. Polterovich, Victor, 1995. "Towards the Theory of Privatization," MPRA Paper 20151, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Sato, Kazuo, 1990. "Indicative planning in Japan," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 625-647, December.
    5. Cristina Bicchieri & Carlo Rovelli, 1995. "Evolution and Revolution," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(2), pages 201-224, April.
    6. Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Minzyuk, Larysa, 2010. "The development of non-monetary means of payment," MPRA Paper 28167, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.
    2. Ageeva Svetlana & Suslov Nikita, 2005. "Energy Consumption and GDP in Market and Transitional Economies," EERC Working Paper Series 05-05e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    3. S.I. Boyarchenko & S.Z. Levendorskii, 2000. "Search-Money-and-Barter Models of Financial Stabilization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 332, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    4. Sergei Guriev & Dmitry Kvassov, 2000. "Barter for price discrimination? A theory and evidence from Russia," Working Papers w0007, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    coordination failures; corruption; cultural inertia; institutional trap; multiple equilibria; path dependence; rent seeking; reputation; systemic crises; transaction costs; transformation costs; transitional rent; trust;

    JEL classification:

    • P30 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
    • P20 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - General

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