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How to Reform the Italian Domestic Adoptions System Through a Centralized Market Design

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Listed:
  • Reggiani, Tommaso

Abstract

Using an innovative variation of the standard Matching Market Design framework, this draft aims to provide inputs useful to drive the reform of the current Italian Domestic Adoption System (Italian families that desire to adopt an Italian child). The problem addressed in this draft, concern how to match the relative small number of waiting children to the large number of waiting families in the most rational and efficient way: each year, the adoptions system is not able to place the 20% of the children in foster care, despite the fact that the number of children (supply side) is very small respect the total amount of families (demand side) willing to adopt. This project is oriented to solve the inefficiencies characterizing the current adoption program, substituting the actual decentralized setup with a more efficient centralized matching market criteria

Suggested Citation

  • Reggiani, Tommaso, 2009. "How to Reform the Italian Domestic Adoptions System Through a Centralized Market Design," MPRA Paper 16294, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:16294
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Blackstone, Erwin A. & Buck, Andrew J. & Hakim, Simon & Spiegel, Uriel, 2008. "Market segmentation in child adoption," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 220-225, September.
    2. Blackstone, Erwin A. & Buck, Andrew J. & Hakim, Simon, 2004. "Privatizing adoption and foster care: Applying auction and market solutions," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 26(11), pages 1033-1049, November.
    3. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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