Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game
Based on the simple model of the deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account pit optimisation. It is proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of game. In the first stage (cooperative) both sides should select the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM and in the second one (competitive) the agreement should be achieved regarding profit division. This can be realised through side payments or by establishing the lignite transfer price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the suboptimal solution – excavation of the smaller pit. Due to information asymmetry realisation of the optimal solution is more probably in vertically integrated firms. Dynamic adjustments of LOM BM plan to short-term changes of energy market using optimisation, BM model, game theory and their valuation as real options is the new direction of further re-search.
|Date of creation:||24 Sep 2006|
|Date of revision:||24 Sep 2006|
|Publication status:||Published in Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium Continuous Surface Mining Department of Mining Engineering III, RWTH Aachen University.ISBN 3(2006): pp. 469-476|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Blair, Roger D & Kaserman, David L, 1987. "A Note on Bilateral Monopoly and Formula Price Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 460-463, June.
- Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006.
"Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne
[Nash bargaining solution and the split of profit in," MPRA Paper 4142, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Jan 2006.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1600. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.