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Self-Interest, Incentives and the Decision-Making

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  • Steinbacher, Matjaz

Abstract

Paper analyzes the impact of incentives and disincentives on the decision-making of individuals. Their role in the decision-making processes is huge, as they affect the cost-benefit analysis of investment projects of scarce resources. They both are subject of huge negative effects. A hidden trap of providing incentives is represented by costs any such activity involves, with coercive subsidies having socialized costs for the benefits of individuals. This makes them very dangerous and controversial.

Suggested Citation

  • Steinbacher, Matjaz, 2009. "Self-Interest, Incentives and the Decision-Making," MPRA Paper 15041, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15041
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15041/1/MPRA_paper_15041.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolutionary games; incentives and disincentives; investment decisions; Roy model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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