Bid early and get it cheap - Timing effects in Internet auctions
Most internet auction sites, like eBay, use a proxy bidding system where bidders can put in their maximum bid and let a proxy bidder (a computer) bid for them. Yet many bidders speculate about how to bid and employ bidding strategies. This paper examines how the timing of bids can affect the ﬁnal price. In a unique data set of 17,000 Scandinavian furniture auctions it turns out that early price increases, i.e. much early bidding, scare off bidders and therefore result in lower prices, whereas much late bidding results in higher prices. Sniping is therefore not a successful strategy to avoid bidding wars.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2008|
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- Ockenfels, Axel & Roth, Alvin E., 2006.
"Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 297-320, May.
- Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2003. "Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction," CESifo Working Paper Series 992, CESifo Group Munich.
- Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, .
"Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet,"
Papers on Strategic Interaction
2002-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September.
- Patrick Bajari & Ali Horta�su, 2004. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 457-486, June.
- Young Han Lee & Ulrike Malmendier, 2007.
"The Bidder's Curse,"
NBER Working Papers
13699, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2001. "The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-33, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
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