Learning to bid, but not to quit – Experience and Internet auctions
A classic argument in economics is that experience in the market place will eliminate mistakes and cognitive biases. Internet auctions are a popular market were some bidders gather extensive experience. In a unique data set from a Scandinavian auction site I question if and what bidders learn. At face value experienced bidders do adapt better bidding strategies. However, the so-called pseudo-endowment eﬀect does not disappear. Regardless of their experience, bidders will be inclined to increase their willingness to pay as a response to having had “ownership” (the leading bid) before being outbid. Thus, this data can conﬁrm that feedback, and especially negative feedback, seems to be a critical component in learning.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Graham Loomes & Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, 2003.
"Do Anomalies Disappear in Repeated Markets?,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(486), pages C153-C166, March.
- Bramsen, Jens-Martin, 2008. "A pseudo-endowment effect in internet auctions," MPRA Paper 14813, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jacinto Braga & Steven Humphrey & Chris Starmer, 2006.
"Market Experience Eliminates Some Anomalies – And Creates New Ones,"
2006-19, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Braga, Jacinto & Humphrey, Steven J. & Starmer, Chris, 2009. "Market experience eliminates some anomalies--and creates new ones," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 401-416, May.
- Jacinto Braga & Steven Humphrey & Chris Starmer, 2006. "Market Experience Eliminates Some Anomalies – And Creates New Ones," Discussion Papers 2006-19, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Garratt, Rod & Wooders, John, 2004.
"Efficiency in Second-Price Auctions: A New Look at Old Data,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
qt5d86p46d, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Rodney Garratt & John Wooders, 2010. "Efficiency in Second-Price Auctions: A New Look at Old Data," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 37(1), pages 43-50, August.
- John A. List, 2003.
"Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace,"
NBER Working Papers
9736, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John A. List, 2004. "Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 615-625, 03.
- John List, 2004. "Neoclassical theory versus prospect theory: Evidence from the marketplace," Framed Field Experiments 00174, The Field Experiments Website.
- John List, 2003.
"Does market experience eliminate market anomalies?,"
Natural Field Experiments
00297, The Field Experiments Website.
- John A. List, 2003. "Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(1), pages 41-71.
- Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortaçsu, 2004. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 457-486, June.
- John List & Michael Haigh, 2005.
"Do professional traders exhibit myopic loss aversion? An experimental analysis,"
Artefactual Field Experiments
00052, The Field Experiments Website.
- Michael S. Haigh & John A. List, 2005. "Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(1), pages 523-534, 02.
- Haigh, Michael S. & List, John A., 2002. "Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 28554, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Livingston, 2010. "The Behavior Of Inexperienced Bidders In Internet Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(2), pages 237-253, 04.
- Bramsen, Jens-Martin, 2008. "Bid early and get it cheap - Timing effects in Internet auctions," MPRA Paper 14811, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2001. "The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-33, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Ockenfels, Axel & Roth, Alvin E., 2006.
"Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 297-320, May.
- Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2003. "Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction," CESifo Working Paper Series 992, CESifo Group Munich.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14815. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.